The EU and Globalisation
André Gattolin
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André Gattolin
PhD in Information and Communication Sciences, former Senator, Rapporteur for the fact-finding mission on foreign interference in academia (2021)
Part 1
Given the fierce competition between the United States and China, as well as the growing ambitions of certain regional powers, Europe is still struggling to assert itself as a leading geopolitical player. Faced with a military threat at its borders, it is also under threat at its very heart from repeated hybrid attacks that undermine its stability and sovereignty.
Fortunately, Europe has taken action and is now tackling head-on the digital, informational, electoral and economic interference to which it is subjected. However, it remains less vigilant in the face of malicious activities targeting the world of research and knowledge. It is true that such interference is rather difficult to detect and counter due to its multifaceted nature. This can range from the theft of sensitive scientific knowledge to the deliberate introduction of bias into the teaching of a subject. Its effects are rarely immediate and must therefore be assessed over the long term.
Scientific rivalry between nations is not a new phenomenon, but for a long time it took place within a peaceful framework, in accordance with the traditional rules of competition and international cooperation. The recent proliferation of predatory practices and cognitive manipulation marks a paradigm shift that should serve as a warning. All the more so as it is clear that Europe[1] appears to have become the main target of interference affecting the world of knowledge[2].
Furthermore, it is undeniable that significant inequalities persist between European countries in the field of higher education and research (HER). What impact does this have on the continuation of such interference? In the eyes of its aggressors, is Europe a single, overarching target or a fragmented collection of individual targets?
1 - Multifaceted forms of foreign interference with distinctive characteristics
1-1. A definition that is still the subject of debate
The term ‘foreign interference’ has only come into common usage in recent years. Attempts at a formal definition remain rare, vary from one country to another and are subject to differences depending on the specific context in which they are applied. The severity of the methods used is generally assessed on the basis of their degree of seriousness and blameworthiness.
It is generally accepted that such behaviour is manipulative or coercive in nature, and that it is often carried out in the utmost secrecy. The fact that this type of operation originates from foreign sources, but very often takes place through the involvement – whether voluntary or not – of local actors, is a consistent feature of all current definitions.
The list of areas in which foreign interference occurs, however, remains all too often incomplete. For instance, the definition currently provided by the European Union institutions emphasises ‘manipulations aimed at influencing and destabilising public opinion and interfering in political decision-making processes’, whilst others broaden this definition to include the gathering of sensitive information to the detriment of the nation’s fundamental interests.
As things stand, there is therefore no official definition that precisely covers all such malicious foreign operations, whether in terms of the methods used, the targets sought or the intended objectives. It must be acknowledged that this is a complex task, one that is hardly made easier by the lack of transparency on the part of the bodies responsible for combating interference, as well as by the victims themselves, who fear they may be held responsible for a lack of vigilance. Added to this is the rapid development of new technologies, which is having a significant impact on how interference methods are evolving. Who is currently in a position to assess the precise impact that the phenomenal advances in artificial intelligence will have in this field in the future?
1-2. The specific characteristics of foreign interference in the world of knowledge
Apart from the characteristics common to all forms of foreign interference, each type of sector-specific interference is generally distinguished from the others by its own specific features.
Here are four characteristics specific to the world of research and higher education:
- A narrow scope governed by specific rules
The academic world is a relatively small and elitist environment. Recruitment within it is highly selective. Its legitimacy and authority are based on mastery of knowledge rather than on power. It also enjoys specific freedoms (academic freedom) and a high degree of operational autonomy, which protect it from any interference by the political authorities, towards whom it harbours a deeply rooted mistrust.
- The importance of the human factor
In this relatively closed environment, interpersonal interactions play a key role, and trust between stakeholders is essential to the effective functioning of knowledge-sharing mechanisms. Whilst the use of electronic means of communication has certainly grown considerably over recent decades, it is carried out in accordance with security protocols whose reliability is well established. Whether it is a question of interference or counter-interference, human intelligence plays a crucial role. Infiltrating this environment requires the deployment of extensive human networks to achieve its objectives.
- Long-term mechanisms
Foreign interference in higher education and research is characterised, at all levels, by a longer time horizon than that observed in other fields. This type of intervention is complex to carry out and requires meticulous planning, the mobilisation of significant resources, as well as patience, expertise and discretion on the part of those in charge. The actual benefits of an operation of this kind can only be assessed over time. By their very nature, fundamental scientific knowledge precedes the technological applications that stem from it; these, in turn, only yield tangible benefits at the end of a long and often uncertain process.
- A wide range of objectives
Foreign interference in the academic world differs from other forms of interference in that the objectives attributed to it can be relatively diverse.
1–3. A categorisation by intended purpose, specific to the academic world
This wide variety of objectives stems quite directly from the diversity of roles assigned to the academic world. These are essentially of two types: a research role, whether basic or applied; and a role involving the transmission and dissemination of this knowledge, primarily through higher education or by providing expertise to decision-making bodies within society. Following various studies carried out on this subject[3], a fundamental distinction should be drawn between interference that can be described as ‘extractive’ and interference of a cognitive or ideological nature.
1-3-1. Foreign interference of an extractive nature
These are acts of interference characterised by an attempt to unlawfully or improperly appropriate sensitive knowledge held and protected by a third country. Basic research and the so-called ‘exact’ sciences are the main targets of this type of operation, which bears a strong resemblance to economic, industrial or military espionage.
Within the context of this extractive interference, two types of objectives can be distinguished:
- The acquisition of scientific or technological knowledge with the aim of gaining a competitive advantage (knowledge transfert without compensation, gains in productivity or market share, etc.). This type of interference, which could be described as ‘predatory’, is increasingly targeting so-called ‘dual-use’ technologies, that is, those which have both civilian and military applications.
- The gathering of sensitive and confidential information concerning a country’s critical infrastructure (military installations, energy, communications and transport networks, port facilities, etc.). This is motivated by a desire to neutralise, or even sabotage or destroy, the strategic capabilities of the targeted country in the event of a potential military escalation.
In both cases, these are extremely intrusive and coercive methods which often involve breaking and entering, blackmail and psychological pressure, as well as bribery and the manipulation of intermediaries, in order to achieve their aims.
1-3-2. Foreign interference of a cognitive or ideological nature
These interventions are described as ‘cognitive’ because their primary aim is to subtly influence the intellectual sphere of a rival country. They are mainly directed to the social sciences and humanities, whose research can have a significant impact on the direction of public debate.
They are themselves divided into two distinct sub-categories:
- Malicious influence operations, described as ‘corrective’, which aim to alter the negative perception that opinion leaders and the general public in a given country have of the intervening state. These are sometimes described as operations to positively reshape the country’s international image[4]; however, the methods employed go far beyond generally accepted policies of cultural influence. Often regarded as impervious to external criticism, authoritarian regimes are in fact more concerned than is generally believed about the consequences of their poor reputation, particularly when this leads to significant legal or trade sanctions, or even their ostracism from the international community.
- Malicious operations aimed at causing or exacerbating divisions within a given country with the view to destabilising it and undermining the legitimacy of its leaders. Their implementation is often facilitated by the very high degree of freedom of expression and the strong critical thinking that have always prevailed within Western universities. Their disruptive objectives are very similar to those of disinformation campaigns carried out on social media. The intended effects, however, are more subtle and targeted: they seek to hijack the legitimacy and intellectual authority enjoyed by the academic world in order to bolster biased narratives designed to influence national decision-makers.
2 – Europe is at the forefront of the new war on knowledge
Although there is as yet no authoritative international study on this issue, an analysis of recent sector-specific research supports the view that Europe has become the primary target, on a global scale, of attacks directed at the academic world. At first glance, this finding may seem surprising, as our continent’s investment in R&D currently ranks only third in the world, far behind the United States and China, the latter having risen rapidly. The quality of our basic research and the excellence of our higher education institutions[5] are therefore far from being the sole explanation for the appeal of interfering states hold for the European academic world. Other significant factors help to provide a better understanding of the prominence of this threat on our continent.
2-1. The three factors underlying the significance of this threat in Europe
2-1-1. A greater emphasis on international opportunities than elsewhere
The first explanatory factor lies in the exceptional international outlook of research and higher education in Europe. The so-called ‘open science’ culture – which regards knowledge as a common good and an essential tool for peaceful cooperation between nations – remains dominant. European countries host the largest number of foreign researchers. The same is true of foreign students: Europe currently has 1.4 million non-European students, compared with fewer than 1.2 million international students in the United States and fewer than 400,000 in China. Tuition fees are, generally speaking, much lower than elsewhere.
Whilst restrictions on entry and the length of stay are tending to become stricter in the rest of the world, Europe is continuing its policy of openness. It is thus attracting many of those who previously favoured the United States, Canada or Australia as their preferred destination.
2-1-2. Financial vulnerability and increased foreign dependence
The second factor relates to the extreme fragility of funding. State budget contributions are steadily declining, whilst the number of universities running a deficit continues to rise. To cope with this, institutions are attempting to bolster their own resources by raising tuition fees for non-European students and forging more partnerships with foreign institutions and businesses. This increased dependence is driving many institutions to accept highly asymmetrical relationships with certain third countries, whether in terms of knowledge transfer or infringements on freedom of research and expression[6].
2-1-3. A fragmented and poorly coordinated European research and higher education sector
The third factor is the extreme fragmentation of the European higher education and research sector. Member States maintain separate national organisations, their intelligence services remain insufficiently coordinated, and the European Union unfortunately has only limited powers in these sensitive areas. Added to this national fragmentation is the autonomy of institutions, which compete quite fiercely with one another. This fragmentation presents a significant opportunity for countries pursuing a deliberate policy of predation or interference.
2-2. The threat assessment varies considerably from one European country to another
2-2-1. The main factors driving differentiation at national level
There are numerous differentiating factors. In addition to those mentioned above (performance, openness, dependence and fragmentation), other factors are specific to the national context of each higher education and research institution:
- The country’s economic and demographic weight, as well as its political and diplomatic influence in Europe and beyond;
- Its degree of economic dependence on foreign funding and investment, in relation to its level of debt;
- Its degree of political, economic and social stability;
- Its specific geopolitical context, in particular the importance of its strategic infrastructure and its proximity to areas of tension.
2-2-2. Diversity within Europe, which can be categorised into five main types of situation
Despite the sometimes-marked national disparities across Europe, it must nevertheless be noted that, confronted with these threats, higher education and research institutions on our continent are less fragmented than one might fear. It is therefore possible to group them into five broad categories:
Group 1: Large countries with highly developed economies whose research system (HER) perform exceptionally well on an international scale. These highly coveted countries are the target of numerous attempts at interference, both extractive and cognitive. The growing difficulties in funding their research and higher education systems are driving them to turn to sources of funding outside Europe, at the risk of becoming overly dependent on countries with malicious intentions. Less stable than in the past, they are also the target of major cognitive influence operations. This group comprises four countries which, in descending order of the intensity of the attacks suffered, are: the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy.
Group 2: These are smaller countries, yet they rank amongst the nations with the highest per capita R&D expenditure in the world. Their scientific and technological research, which is at the cutting edge in several cutting-edge sectors, is now frequently the target of interference aimed at resource extraction. Their geographical position, which is often highly strategic, also serves as a pretext for cognitive interference designed to destabilise them. These are mainly countries located in the north of the continent (Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Estonia and Finland), but also the Czech Republic and Austria.
Group 3: These are countries whose economic progress has at times been slow and disrupted by various crises, but which, through hard work, now have a research and higher education sector of a fairly high standard. Having long been relatively spared from foreign interference, their research and higher education sector – which are often a key component of major European research programmes – is now the target of a growing number of malicious attacks. The geographical location of these countries, on the fringes of the continent, also exposes them to an increasing volume of cognitive and ideological interference. The countries in this group are Spain, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Iceland, Greece and Malta.
Group 4: Countries led by nationalist or populist governments, which are critical of the European Union and maintain relationships that are at times ambiguous with certain authoritarian and aggressive powers. Their illiberal practices weigh heavily on their higher education and research sectors, which struggle to modernise and become more autonomous. Foreign influence of a cognitive nature, often with the complicity or tacit approval of the national authorities, is particularly strong in these countries. The composition of this group varies depending on the results of national elections. Consequently, Hungary is no longer part of it. By contrast, Slovakia and Bulgaria have recently joined this group.
Group 5: These are among the continent’s poorest countries, awaiting their accession to the Union. Their higher education and research sectors, still plagued by numerous archaic practices, remain excessively subject to political authority, which imposes significant restrictions upon them. There are numerous instances of political – and sometimes religious – interference. These are often coupled with interference from external powers hoping to turn these countries into their rear bases in anticipation of their future accession to the Union. This group of countries includes Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia.
3 – The reasons behind a trend that has now spread across the whole of Europe
This brief overview confirms and expands on our observation: Europe is now the number one target of foreign interference in the academic sphere. This offensive is widespread, with no European country appearing to be immune to it, regardless of the performance of its higher education and research sector.
a) From de-escalation to renewed tensions
As regards interference in the world of knowledge, Europe experienced more than two decades of calm following the fall of the Wall, the reunification of Germany and the gradual integration of the former Central and Eastern European countries into the Union. The collapse of the USSR significantly reduced the espionage and foreign propaganda operations that had targeted Western Europe during the Cold War. Admittedly, these intrusive operations never ceased entirely, but their frequency had become much more sporadic during the 1990s and 2000s.
This lull was, however, short-lived. From the mid-2000s onwards, economic and trade disputes between developed and emerging countries intensified significantly. Regulated competition quickly gave way to unbridled rivalry, bringing predatory and extractive interference back into vogue.
b) A widespread patterns of interference approaching a critical level
In Europe, the resurgence of scientific predation from the 2010s onwards initially targeted the countries most renowned for their basic research and technological innovation (Group 1 countries), before rapidly spreading to Group 2 countries, which also demonstrate very high levels of scientific performance, albeit in fields more specific to certain sectors. The other groups of countries, which had long been spared, are now also affected, particularly due to their growing participation in major European research programmes.
However, the factor that has contributed most to the spread of this threat across all countries on the continent in recent years is, without a doubt, the significant increase in cognitive interference aimed at destabilisation. Our continent is now portrayed as a genuine ideological enemy by an unprecedented number of countries ruled by autocratic regimes[7]. Weakened by successive crises and lacking any truly autonomous defence capability, Europe is perceived as a fragile power in the eyes of several major predators who dream of its disintegration and dismantling for their own gain. Owing to the way it operates, the European Union’s decision-making process can easily be hampered or derailed by opposition from just one of its Member States. Thus, the rule of unanimous voting within the European Council on certain strategic issues effectively grants a right of veto to certain countries (such as those in Group 4) that have little regard for European unity and are under the influence of certain particularly aggressive external powers[8].
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Against a backdrop of growing geopolitical tensions and open conflicts directly affecting our continent, the possibility of a clash of civilisations is very real. For it is one thing to dispute ownership of sensitive knowledge; it is quite another – and far more serious – to fundamentally challenge the principles and rules governing the production of knowledge.
To tackle this threat effectively, two sets of issues that have not yet been addressed here need to be clarified:
- Which states are targeting our knowledge? What are their underlying intentions towards Europe? What scale of resources are they deploying to achieve this?
- What measures have Europeans taken to try to curb the threat? Are they sufficient to meet this challenge, or do they require greater investment and better coordination between states?
These points will be addressed in a second part to be published shortly.
[1] By the generic term ‘Europe’, we mean here all the 27 Member States or those in the process of accession, as well as the countries on the continent that are associated with them under various research and academic mobility programmes.
[2] The second part of this article will focus on identifying vulnerabilities specific to European countries.
[3] These include, in particular, those carried out by Kyle A. Long and Carly O’Connell as part of the French Senate’s 2021 fact-finding mission into non-European influences in academia as well as those conducted by the French Office for Scientific Integrity.
[4] A process known as ‘image repair’, the theory of which was developed by William L. Benoit in a book entitled "Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration Strategies" (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995).
[5] Europe, largely thanks to the UK, continues to rank second globally in the three main international university rankings (the QS World University Rankings, Times Higher Education and the Shanghai Ranking).
[6] Several studies carried out at international or European level highlight a resurgence of cases of external interference on our continent, which seriously undermine academic freedom. Notable examples include the European Parliament’s ‘Academic Freedom Monitor 2025’ report and the European University Association’s IV’ report.
[7] According to the V-Dem Institute’s 2025 report, in 2024, for the first time, the number of autocratic regimes exceeded that of democratic regimes worldwide; the former now account for more than 72% of the world’s population.
[8] Thus, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary – which has maintained highly controversial relations with Russia, China and Turkey – is by far the EU country that has exercised its right of veto most frequently over the past fifteen years. It has done so, in particular, in relation to decisions concerning aid to Ukraine, sanctions imposed on Russia and statements on the human rights situation in China.
Publishing Director : Pascale Joannin
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