The European Union finds itself at an unprecedented strategic crossroads. As the world faces a major geopolitical reset marked by persistent conflicts, trade tensions and energy crises, Europe must respond to increasingly complex and interconnected hybrid threats that challenge the foundations of our collective security.

Europe and the invisible war

Europe finds itself de facto confronted with a hybrid war, without being truly prepared for it, even though the European Council has committed to taking action to ensure that the Union becomes more sovereign and responsible for its own defence, and is better equipped to act and respond autonomously to immediate and future challenges and threats by implementing the comprehensive defence objectives set out in the Versailles Declaration.

Based on this declaration, the Strategic Compass for security and defence defined in 2022, the White Paper on European defence preparedness by 2030 and the political priorities set by the European Council, on 19 March 2025, the European Commission presented the ReArm Europe plan, which paves the way for a massive increase in defence investment in Europe, enabling up to €800 billion in additional defence spending in the coming years. This plan was adopted in December 2025 by the Council and the European Parliament.

As part of this plan, the European Commission proposed that Member States request the activation of the national safeguard clause of the Stability and Growth Pact. In October, the Council activated this clause for sixteen Member States. This procedure gives them greater budgetary flexibility in terms of defence spending, while remaining within the framework of the Union's budgetary rules.

The 27 Member States are also cooperating on security and defence through the European Peace Facility. Created in March 2021 with a budget of more than €17 billion; it is financed by contributions from Member States (outside the EU budget) and comprises two pillars: one for military operations and the other for assistance measures.

At the request of the European Council, on 16 October the Commission and the High Representative proposed a Roadmap for Peace and Defence Preparedness by 2030, a comprehensive plan to strengthen European defence capabilities.

In addition, the Council and the European Parliament reached agreement on a €1.5 billion European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIP), which was adopted by Parliament on 25 November and by the Council on 8 December 2025.

Given the amount of money it is now allocating to this area and the political priorities it is attaching to it, there is no doubt that the European Union has made a deliberate decision to equip itself with a war economy!

But is this sufficient in view of the reality and diversity of the threats and risks that jeopardise European security and stability?

But this is not a conventional war, with tanks and bombings; it is an insidious hybrid form of warfare that simultaneously targets infrastructure, the economy, social cohesion and democratic values. Since 2022, the Union's military spending has reached historic levels, with €440 billion per year devoted to defence, according to data from the European Defence Agency (2025). Yet the budgets allocated to civil resilience – health, energy, cybersecurity, agriculture – remain dramatically insufficient.

This asymmetry is problematic. The most pressing threats come not only from the battlefields of Ukraine, but also from sabotaged undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, cyberattacks paralysing hospitals, drug shortages and disinformation campaigns that erode citizens' trust in institutions. As highlighted by the Hybrid CoE, Europe is facing an invisible conflict, where the boundaries between military and civil security are blurring.

Without a comprehensive doctrine, the European Union could become a military giant that is vulnerable to hybrid threats, which themselves know no borders.

The French Strategic Review shows the way forward by integrating a holistic approach to security, combining military defence, economic resilience and the protection of critical infrastructure. The European Union needs to draw inspiration from this to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past and to build a coherent and balanced response to the challenges of the 21st century.

I. Europe under pressure: critical and interconnected vulnerabilities

A systemic risk analysis, such as that conducted by the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, reveals that Europe is exposed to often interconnected multidimensional threats. These vulnerabilities, which affect areas as diverse as infrastructure, the economy, society and the environment, show a Europe that is fragmented, dependent and reactive, rather than proactive.

1. Critical infrastructure under pressure

European infrastructure, whether this means energy networks, transport systems or communications, is now a prime target for malicious actors.

• Energy: Diversification efforts undertaken since March 2022 have reduced dependence on Russian gas by 19% of its imports, according to European Commission data. On 26 January, the Council adopted the regulation on the elimination of imports of piped gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia into the EU.

• Cybersecurity: 60% of European power plants still use obsolete control systems, according to ENISA. In 2023, a cyberattack in Estonia plunged 200,000 homes into darkness for 48 hours, revealing the security flaws in critical infrastructure. Budgets allocated to cybersecurity, although increasing, remain largely insufficient to cover all risks.

• Logistics: 80% of the EU's foreign trade transits through sea routes controlled by third parties, such as the Strait of Malacca or the Suez Canal. The blockage of the Suez Canal in 2023 cost the European economy €1 billion per day (World Bank, 2023), highlighting the vulnerability of supply chains.

2. A dependent and fragile economy

Europe remains heavily dependent on external suppliers for strategic resources, making it vulnerable to geopolitical blackmail and shortages.

• Semiconductors: 40% of the electronic chips used in Europe come from Taiwan. To avoid the effects of a shortage such as that of 2024, which would have cost 0.3% of European GDP (around €60 billion) according to European Commission estimates, the EU has adopted a regulation to strengthen the European semiconductor ecosystem.

• Medicines: 80% of active pharmaceutical ingredients are imported from India and China. In 2024, a shortage of antibiotics led to a 15% increase in mortality in some hospitals in Eastern Europe (ECDC, 2025). The ‘pharma package’ proposed by the Commission in 2023 in the wake of the pandemic was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in December 2025.

• Rare earths: China controls 98% of the global market for these resources, which are essential for green technologies and defence. A partial embargo in 2024 slowed down the production of electric vehicles at Volkswagen and Renault, resulting in estimated losses of €2 billion. The EU therefore adopted a regulation on critical raw materials in March 2024.

3. Global risks and endogenous crises: Europe's blind spots

The 2016 European Security Strategy, although ambitious, overlooks two categories of factors that undermine security: global risks and endogenous crises. However, these often-underestimated blind spots are having an increasingly heavy impact on the stability of the continent.

A - Global risks: an underestimated systemic threat

Global risks – whether prolonged droughts (as in Spain, where olive oil production has fallen by 40%), pandemics or cyberattacks (such as the one that paralysed the port of Rotterdam in 2023, costing £200 million) – are interconnected. A crisis in one area (e.g. gas shortages) can trigger another (e.g. the collapse of supply chains), creating a destabilising domino effect. Their interconnectedness makes them all the more formidable. Yet the EU deals with these risks in a fragmented manner, without a systemic vision.

B - Endogenous crises: a breeding ground for instability

Internal divisions and endogenous crises weaken the Union's ability to respond to external challenges.

• Political polarisation: Eurosceptic parties account for around 30% of the vote in some Member States, compared with 15% in 2015 (Eurobarometer, 2025). In 2025, they won local elections in five countries. However, Geert Wilders' party, which brought down the government in which it participated, did not win the new parliamentary elections in the Netherlands in October.

• Confidence: The latest Eurobarometer shows that nearly three-quarters of Europeans believe that their country has benefited from EU membership. Support for the euro, as well as for common defence and security, is at one of the highest levels ever recorded. In a contested geopolitical environment, Europeans are increasing their calls for a stronger and more assertive Union, with greater economic independence and a common defence and security policy. They want the institutions to protect them against new threats.

• Territorial inequalities: Per capita GDP differences range from 1 to 7 between Bulgaria and Luxembourg, creating social and economic tensions that can be exploited by malicious actors.

• Public debt: At an average of 82.1% of GDP, debt is limiting the room for manoeuvre of some Member States to invest in resilience at a time when significant efforts are required in terms of defence.

• Migration crisis: Pressure on borders and asylum systems, which remain inadequate despite the EU's adoption of the Pact on Asylum and Migration and proposals for new rules (visas, migration), is creating political and social tensions.

• Demographic challenges: An ageing population and labour shortages in sectors under pressure are exacerbating structural vulnerabilities.

• The disappearance of traditional skills (agriculture, crafts) and dependence on external technologies are weakening local resilience.

C - A systemic challenge

These endogenous crises, combined with global risks, multiply vulnerabilities that can seriously undermine national security. (See, in particular, the work compiled on the Strategic Editorial Platform of the European Centre for Security and Strategy). Faced with these challenges, the European Union must rethink its strategy to incorporate a systemic approach to global risks and endogenous crises. This implies: 

• An updated map of vulnerabilities (such as that of the Hybrid CoE, 2025).
• Scenarios involving multiple threats (e.g. cyberattack + energy shortage + disinformation).
• A rebalancing of budgets between military defence and civil resilience.
• Enhanced coordination between Member States, which are often divided by divergent national priorities (e.g. migration management, energy transition).

II. The failure of current responses: insufficient and fragmented initiatives

The European Union has launched several strategic tools to strengthen its security, but these suffer from three major limitations: a fragmented approach, a lack of coordination between Member States, and budgets that are skewed towards military defence.

1. Undersized strategic instruments

• The Strategic Compass (2022): Adopted to strengthen European defence, the Compass focuses primarily on military aspects, without fully integrating the civilian dimensions of hybrid threats. Its budget, mainly devoted to defence, contrasts with the limited resources allocated to civilian resilience.

• The Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (GSEUFS), is currently being revised and is due to be finalised in 2026. This revision offers a unique opportunity to integrate a more comprehensive approach to threats, including global risks and endogenous crises. However, current preparatory work shows that this integration remains partial, particularly regarding the combination of threats.

• The Hybrid Centre of Excellence (Hybrid CoE), created in 2017, is an essential coordination platform. With a limited budget of €8 million per year, it plays a crucial role in analysing hybrid threats, but its mandate and resources remain insufficient to deal with the complex combinations of threats that typify the current security landscape. According to the Centre, 65% of hybrid threats combine at least two aspects (cyber, disinformation, economic pressure)

• The NIS2 Directive on cybersecurity, adopted in 2022, which strengthened cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure. However, this directive covers only fifteen of the thirty vulnerable sectors identified and does not take into account threat combinations.

2. Recent Initiatives

• In April 2025, the Commission proposed a text establishing a European internal security strategy. Launched with a budget of €1.2 billion over five years, this initiative aims to strengthen the protection of critical infrastructure both externally and internally. However, its mandate remains too narrow and should cover all aspects of hybrid threats.

• The space resilience strategy proposed by the ESA aims to guarantee European sovereignty in space, a critical area for communications, navigation, security and crisis management. New funding was adopted in November 2025 and should enable adaptation to the new space context.

• The 2023 economic security strategy identifies four major risks: supply chain resilience, technological security, critical infrastructure security and economic coercion. However, the resources allocated (€1 billion per year) are insufficient to meet challenges estimated at more than €50 billion. In December 2025, the Commission proposed new initiatives to strengthen the Union's economic security and boost competitiveness.

• Horizon Europe (2021-2027) allocates €2.3 billion to resilience projects. Tangible results have already been achieved in cluster 3 (Civil Security), which is allocating €1.5 billion to resilience, cluster 4 (Digital, Industry and Space), which is allocating €500 million to cybersecurity, and cluster 5 (Climate, Energy and Mobility), which is allocating €300 million to climate risks.

• Other financial levers already mobilised include the European Defence Fund, €1.2 billion of which has already been allocated to hybrid resilience projects, as well as public-private partnerships (Cybershield project, €60 million; Spaceguard project, €45 million; and Energyshield project, €50 million).

These examples demonstrate that certain tools already exist and are producing tangible results. 

3. A structural imbalance between defence and resilience

The European Union's military spending stands at €440 billion per year, or 2.2% of European GDP. In contrast, budgets allocated to civil resilience – health, energy, cybersecurity, agriculture – represent only around 0.5% of GDP, or €100 billion. This imbalance is problematic: for every euro spent on civil resilience, €4.4 is allocated to military defence. Yet hybrid threats – cyberattacks, disinformation, shortages, health crises – are just as critical to Europe's stability. In 2024, a cyberattack on grain silos in Germany caused a local wheat shortage for three weeks, leading to a 20% price increase and social tensions. Yet budgets for securing agricultural and logistical infrastructure remain minimal compared to military spending.

The ongoing process of developing the next multiannual financial framework for 2028-2034 must take note of these needs and examine the possibility of redeploying certain appropriations (particularly those dedicated to structural actions[1]) or the benefit of European resilience, with budgetary flexibility margins allowing for the necessary additional adjustments to be made when the time comes.

III. A comprehensive doctrine the six strategic functions as a framework for action

The European Union must learn all the relevant lessons from existing inspiring models:

• France: Its defence and national security strategy largely illustrates what the EU needs.
• Sweden: Its total defence strategy has reduced its vulnerabilities by 35% between 2020 and 2024 (Hybrid CoE, 2024).
• NATO: Its Resilience Concept has improved coordination between allies by 25% (NATO, 2023).

As shown in a recent analysis, to meet these challenges, the European Union must adopt a systemic approach based on six strategic functions: anticipation, protection, prevention, deterrence, resilience and recovery, with a view to establishing the security and resilience guarantees and confidence-building measures that are essential in such a challenging geopolitical and security context.

1. Anticipation: detecting weak signals

The European Union must develop early warning systems to identify emerging threats, risks and crises.

2. Protection: securing critical infrastructure

It is imperative to establish common European standards and protocols to protect critical infrastructure.

3. Prevention: reducing structural vulnerabilities

The European Union must build up strategic stocks and diversify its supply chains to avoid shortages.

4. Deterrence: discouraging malicious actors

A unified and immediate European response to hybrid crises is needed. In the face of the Russian cyberattacks of 2024, a coordinated response could have limited their impact, but the lack of a common mechanism weakened the response.

5. Resilience: absorbing shocks

Business continuity plans, such as those put in place in banks after the Covid-19 pandemic, must be rolled out across all critical sectors.

6. Recovery: ensuring a rapid return to normal

Dedicated European teams must be able to respond within 48 hours of a crisis, as proposed after the attack on the Baltic cables. A post-crisis reconstruction fund, worth several billion euros, would finance the restoration of infrastructure and support affected populations. These functions, inspired by French and Swedish models, are not mere theoretical concepts, but operational pillars for a strategy capable of meeting contemporary challenges. These pillars are based on models that have already proven their worth, with tangible results in terms of reducing vulnerabilities and improving response times. The task now is to extend and coordinate them at European level.

IV. Towards a resilient and sovereign Europe

To put this doctrine into action, several urgent measures need to be taken.

1. Integrate the six strategic functions into all common policies

Every internal European policy must be developed using a genuine strategic intelligence process so as to include the six strategic functions. Let us take these two common policies as an example:

A – Agricultural Policy (CAP)

• Anticipation: Establishment of an early warning system for food crises (droughts, epizootics).
• Protection: Enhanced safety standards for supply chains.
• Prevention: Establishment of strategic stocks of cereals and proteins.
• Deterrence: Sanctions against states disrupting agricultural markets.
• Resilience: Continuity plans for agricultural sectors.
• Recovery: Post-crisis reconstruction funds for farmers.

B – Energy Policy

• Anticipation: Monitoring geopolitical risks to supplies.
• Protection: Securing electricity and gas networks.
• Prevention: Diversification of energy sources (renewables, nuclear).
• Deterrence: Targeted embargoes on Russian fossil fuels.
• Resilience: Smart rationing plans in the event of a crisis.
• Recovery: European infrastructure repair teams.

This requires in-depth impact studies undertaken from both a sector-specific and a global perspective, given the systemic phenomena that may result from a combination of crisis factors.

2. Expand and strengthen existing initiatives

ProtectEU must expand its mandate to include the cognitive and societal dimensions of hybrid threats, with a budget increased to €3 billion over five years. The European Resilience Space (ERS) initiative must accelerate the deployment of the three pillars (Earth observation, secure connectivity, resilient navigation) with a budget of €10 billion by 2030. The NIS2 Directive should extend its scope to thirty vulnerable sectors, with mandatory cybersecurity audits and penalties for non-compliance.

3. Establish a European Hybrid Crisis Management Centre (EHCMC)

This operational centre should be tasked with coordinating responses to multiple threats in real time (activating emergency protocols, coordinating responses between Member States, mobilising rapid response teams) in conjunction with specialised agencies (ENISA, ECDC) and institutions. For example, in the event of an attack similar to the one in the Baltic Sea, the EHCMC would enable a coordinated response in less than six hours (compared to 48 hours currently), limiting economic losses to €200 million. A budget of €70 million per year could be proposed for this purpose, financed by the European Commission and Horizon Europe.

4. Include ten scenarios in the new security strategy 

The French ‘Resilience’ exercises and the scenarios developed by the Hybrid CoE demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach. According to a report published in 2024 by this centre, countries that use integrated scenarios reduce their vulnerabilities by 30%. Ten scenarios should be included in this new text to model cascade effects, with €30 million per year in funding to be provided by Horizon Europe.

5. Launch a European Resilience Fund (€50 billion per year)

This new European Fund designed specifically for resilience must be structured around the following priorities:

• Strategic stocks (gas, medicines, semiconductors): €20 billion.
• Continuity plans for critical infrastructure: €15 billion.
• Support for vulnerable states (Eastern Europe): €10 billion.
• Infrastructure modernisation: €5 billion.

This fund could have prevented the semiconductor shortage of 2024, which cost €60 billion (0.3% of European GDP).

6. Develop a network of 1,000 resilient cities by 2030

Inspired by the Rockefeller Foundation's ‘100 Resilient Cities’ programme, which has reduced economic losses by 50%, this network of a thousand cities would have an annual budget of €150 million financed by the Cohesion Fund.

It would impose strict criteria on initiatives by cities involved in this network:

• Business continuity plans
• Annual crisis management exercises
• Appropriate infrastructure
• Citizen training
• As part of this network, Lyon could have limited the impact of the 2023 cyberattack on its hospital system.

In France, ‘Résilience France’ focuses on analysing major risks and threats, but also on developing the resilience of organisations in terms of preparedness, training, crisis and post-crisis management capabilities, and business continuity. It takes a longer-term view of structural resilience issues and the hybrid risks and threats that could impact our society. In this respect, this association is a model to be replicated.

7. Reforming the treaties to cement resilience in European law

The institutional and functional measures to be adopted should include, in particular:

• Revision of Article 222 of the TFEU (solidarity clause) to explicitly include hybrid threats and endogenous crises.
• Creation of a European Resilience Agency, with an annual budget of €1 billion, under the authority of the General Affairs Council.
• The granting of a right of veto to the European Parliament on hybrid security decisions, to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the measures adopted.

8. Making the General Affairs Council a key player in integrated governance

The success of a comprehensive security and resilience doctrine depends on consistent and centralised European governance.

In this context, while both the European Commission and the European Parliament must play their full role in the governance architecture devoted to these issues, the General Affairs Council must play a pivotal role for three reasons: its ability to coordinate cross-cutting policies, its horizontal mandate covering all areas of EU action to break down barriers, and its political legitimacy to overcome divisions between Member States.

Unlike other Council configurations, which focus on specific sectors, the General Affairs Council is responsible for coordinating all European policies and ensuring that they are aligned with the Union's strategic objectives. This characteristic makes it the ideal actor for:

• Integrate the six strategic functions (anticipation, protection, prevention, deterrence, resilience, recovery) into all internal policies, thereby avoiding a fragmented approach.

• Harmonise priorities between defence (managed by the Foreign Affairs Council) and civil resilience (divided between several Councils), as recommended by the European Parliament in its 2024 resolution.

• Oversee the implementation of threat combination scenarios (e.g. cyberattack + energy shortage + disinformation), in conjunction with the Commission, the EHCMC and specialised agencies (Hybrid CoE, ENISA, ECDC).

In 2025, during the submarine cable crisis in the Baltic Sea, the lack of coordination between the Transport, Energy and Foreign Affairs Councils slowed down the European response. A stronger role for the General Affairs Council would have enabled a unified response in less than 24 hours, limiting economic losses to €200 million.

The General Affairs Council is the only body in which the 27 Member States are equally represented to discuss cross-cutting issues, making it a privileged forum for:

• Overcoming political deadlocks: North-South divisions (e.g. Italy vs. the Netherlands on resilience funds) or East-West divisions (e.g. Hungary vs. France on disinformation) can be mitigated by compromises negotiated under its aegis, as was the case for the post-Covid recovery plan (2021).

• Involving small states: countries such as Slovenia and Ireland, which are often marginalised in the Councils, can make their voices heard on issues such as cybersecurity and energy resilience.

• Guaranteeing subsidiarity[2]: it can balance competences between the Union and Member States, ensuring that European measures complement (rather than replace) national actions, as provided for in Article 5 TEU.

In 2023, Poland blocked a climate agreement in the Environment Council for a year. An intervention by the General Affairs Council, combining political negotiations and financial incentives (cohesion funds), resolved the deadlock within six months.

The General Affairs Council can play a decisive role in establishing resilience in European law and adopting binding legal mechanisms in three ways:

• By overseeing the revision of Article 222 of the TFEU (solidarity clause) to include hybrid threats and endogenous crises, as proposed by the European Parliament (2024).

• By coordinating the process of creating a European Resilience Agency (ERA) responsible for strategic planning and long-term coordination, in conjunction with the Commission and Member States, to avoid overlap with existing structures (e.g. Hybrid CoE, ENISA).

• By ensuring transparency: The General Affairs Council can involve the European Parliament and national parliaments in strategic decisions, as provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 12 TEU), thereby strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the measures adopted.

• The Political and Security Committee (PSC), which prepares the work, has already demonstrated its usefulness in coordinating responses to crises (e.g. evacuations in Afghanistan in 2021). Extending its mandate to civil resilience would enable a faster response to hybrid threats.

• The General Affairs Council is the only body includes three key players: the European Commission (represented by the relevant commissioners), which proposes legislation and manages European funds; the Member States (represented by their ministers), which define political priorities and implement decisions; and finally the European Parliament (via joint meetings), which approves budgets and monitors the Commission's actions.

This triple legitimacy makes it the ideal body for:

1. Negotiating budgets. For example, reallocate part of the £440 billion military expenditure to civil resilience.
2. Overseeing European agencies. It could coordinate the work of the ERA, the EHCMC, Hybrid CoE, ENISA and ECDC, thus avoiding duplication and gaps in crisis response.
3. Involve regions and cities. By involving the Committee of the Regions in its work, the proposed “1,000 resilient cities” could benefit from increased political and financial support.

During the 2015-2016 migration crisis, the General Affairs Council played a crucial role in negotiating the EU-Turkey pact and the Trust Fund for Africa, demonstrating its ability to find pragmatic solutions in times of crisis.

For it to fully play this role, three reforms are necessary:

1. Expand its mandate:

• Add civil resilience to its permanent agenda, alongside institutional affairs and the preparation of European Council meetings.
• Create a permanent working group on hybrid threats, composed of representatives from Member States, the Commission, the European Parliament and independent experts.

2. Strengthen its resources:

• Provide the General Secretariat of the Council with a specific resilience unit, responsible for analysing vulnerabilities and proposing response scenarios, in close cooperation with the relevant agencies.
• Increase the resources of the PSC so that it can deal with civil crises (e.g. cyber-attacks on hospitals) as well as military crises.

3. Involve key actors:

• Organise joint meetings with the Foreign Affairs Council to link defence and civil resilience, as requested by the European Parliament.
• Involve national parliaments through interparliamentary conferences on global security issues, thereby strengthening the democratic legitimacy of decisions.

By strengthening its role, the Union could finally operationalise the six strategic functions and overcome the institutional obstacles that hinder its ability to respond to contemporary challenges. The next step is to embed these reforms in the treaties to ensure their sustainability and effectiveness.

V. Avoiding pitfalls: balancing security and resilience

Three principles must guide its action:

1. Gradually rebalance budgets to achieve the following target: €1 for resilience and €1 for defence, i.e. an additional €440 billion for civil resilience.
2. Develop strategic autonomy: Invest in drones, satellites and European cyber defence, build up strategic stocks in sectors where vulnerabilities have been clearly identified, and ensure the resilience of supply chains by diversifying them rather than relying on the United States or China.
3. Involve citizens and local authorities.

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The European Union must choose between two approaches:

• Continue on the current path, with military polarisation that risks undermining European cohesion and exacerbating civilian vulnerabilities.
• Adopt a comprehensive doctrine combining military security, national security and civilian resilience to build a sovereign, stable and prosperous Europe.

The revision of the European Security Strategy is a historic opportunity to clarify the European Union's ambition in terms of security and resilience. Its citizens, partners, competitors, allies and now its enemies, whether declared or not, will judge it on its ability to become, in the long term, the pole of stability, security, prosperity and power that its leaders constantly proclaim. It lacks neither tools nor resources. What it lacks is a common political will and a shared strategic vision that can be translated into appropriate policies, measures and instruments. Time is running out: hybrid crises will not wait.